How should monetary policy be designed when the central bank has private information about future economic conditions? When private news about shocks to future fundamentals is added to an otherwise standard new Keynesian model, social welfare deteriorates by the central bank's reaction to or revelation of such news. There exists an expected virtue of ignorance, and secrecy constitutes optimal policy. This result holds when news are about cost-push shocks, or about shocks to the monetary policy objective, or about shocks to the natural rate of interest, and even when the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates is taken into account. A lesson of our analysis for a central bank's communication strategy is that Delphic forward guidance that helps the private sector form more accurate forecasts of future shocks can be undesirable and the central bank should instead aim to communicate its state-contingent policy.
Introduction
Central banks have been thought to possess private information about future economic conditions. Romer and Romer (2000) This paper investigates whether central banks should reveal such private news upon receipt and react appropriately. We do this by adding news about future economic conditions to an otherwise standard new Keynesian model as in Woodford (2003) , Galí (2008) or Walsh (2010) . Future economic conditions we consider include future cost-push shocks, future shocks to the policy objective, and future natural rate shocks at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. New Keynesian models are the best suited for our analysis, because the private sector is forward-looking and thus the central bank can manage expectations by conveying its private news, and because they are widely used in central banks to guide policies.
Answering this question is of practical relevance. Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) distinguish between Delphic forward guidance, which involves public statements about "a forecast of macroeconomic performance and likely or intended monetary policy actions based on the policymaker's potentially superior information about future macroeconomic fundamentals and its own policy goals", and Odyssean forward guidance that involves the policy-maker's commitment. The empirical evidence they found suggests that the forward guidance employed by the FOMC has "a substantial Delphic component". Understanding how the central bank should conduct Delphic forward guidance is therefore important, and this paper sheds light on this issue using a formal economic model.
Our main theoretical result is that, regardless of the central bank's ability to commit, it is detrimental to social welfare if the private sector becomes better informed about future economic conditions. In other words, there is an expected virtue of ignorance.
Therefore, the benevolent central bank …nds it optimal to be completely secretive about its private news, and "ignorance is bliss"constitutes optimal monetary policy. In showing this result we only exploit the (log-)linearity of the environment and strict convexity of the loss function, but do not assume speci…c forms of information revelation from the central bank. 2 Thus, this result also holds true in more general (log-)linear DSGE models.
The mechanism behind this result is simple. Because future in ‡ation naturally depends on the realization of future shocks, when the private sector becomes better informed about these shocks, its in ‡ation expectations become more dispersed. This increased dispersion in in ‡ation expectation acts as an additional source of disturbance in the new Keynesian Phillips curve, and therefore it reduces social welfare.
The optimality of central bank secrecy remains true even when the central bank possesses private news about the policy objective or the natural rate of interest with the binding zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. Under the zero lower bound constraint, previous studies have shown that raising in ‡ation expectations improves welfare.
Surprisingly, however, our theoretical result suggests that the central bank should be secretive even if it receives such private news that a negative natural rate shock disappears in the near future. The reason is that the in ‡ation expectations of a better-informed private sector are more dispersed and thus can be lower than that of a less informed private sector. From the ex-ante point of view, the additional losses from lower in ‡ation expectations outweigh the additional gains from higher in ‡ation expectations, thereby making secrecy optimal even at the zero lower bound.
To understand more precisely how the central bank's ability is constrained when faced with a better informed private sector, we numerically solve for the optimal monetary policy when the private sector observes n-period ahead cost-push shocks. Impulse response analysis suggests that, when the central bank can commit, in ‡ation responses become generally more smoothed but the response of marginal cost becomes more magni…ed, as the private sector becomes better informed (n is raised). We also …nd that gains from commitment become larger as the private sector becomes more informed. Robustness checks are also conducted by examining two models with endogenous state variables:
the model with price indexation by Steinsson (2003) and the model with endogenous capital formation by Edge (2003) and Takamura, Watanabe, and Kudo (2006) . Inclusion of endogenous state variables in the model does not alter these results.
The reason for the smoothed in ‡ation response and the magni…ed response of marginal cost under commitment is closely related to the mechanism behind the undesirability of information revelation. When the private sector is better informed about future cost-push shocks, the central bank …nds it optimal to reduce the dispersion in in ‡ation expectation by reducing the dependence of future in ‡ation on foreseen shocks, and this is done only at the cost of increased variation in marginal costs. Inability to commit results in greater loss because a central bank that cannot commit is unable to lower the dispersion in in ‡ation expectations, which increase as the private sector becomes more informed.
This study therefore points to an interesting property of a wide range of (log-)linear new Keynesian models. Although these models are forward-looking, providing more accurate forecasts about future fundamental shocks and responding preemptively to these shocks reduces social welfare. This implication provides a cautionary tale for the use of communication by the central bank. For example, the importance of management of expectations or forward guidance has been very often emphasized in the new Keynesian policy literature (Woodford, 2003) , and also in real world policy-making after many central banks in advanced economies reduced short-term nominal interest rates to the lowest possible level in response to the recent …nancial crisis. 3 Our result suggests that it may be socially undesirable if the central bank, through communication, helps the private sector form more accurate forecasts of future economic conditions. Delphic forward guidance based on private news can be detrimental to social welfare. The central bank should instead aim to conduct Odyssean forward guidance: communicating its statecontingent policy, i.e. what it will do in response to these shocks after they materialize.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the baseline setting and the main theorem about the undesirability of information revelation. In Section 3 we conduct numerical analysis for the baseline model as well as for extended models with backward price indexation or with endogenous capital formation. Section 4 concludes.
Related literature
Whether a central bank should disclose its private information to the public or not is not a new question, but our study is unique in its focus on the role of news shocks in a dynamic setting. There have been many studies, including Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , that discuss the pros and cons of enhanced dissemination of information by central banks. These studies focus on the role of the central bank's disclosure policy in coordinating actions of private agents that are heterogeneously informed about contemporaneous economic conditions, and mainly on static settings. 4 Increased precision of a public signal can reduce welfare in these studies, but the reason is the coordination motives. In contrast, there is neither dispersed information among private 3 Forward guidance is not necessarily a policy prescription under liquidity trap. Svensson (2014) states that "for many years, some central banks have used forward guidance as a natural part of their normal monetary policy." Its usefulness has been reported even in normal time. 4 An exception is Hellwig (2005) which considers a dynamic general equilibrium model in which price setters are heterogeneously informed about the contemporaneous money supply. agents nor a need for coordinating their actions in our model, but information revelation is still detrimental to welfare. Stein (1989) and Moscarini (2007) are also important precursors of our research.
In their model the central bank has private information about its policy goals, but it is not a news shock. By setting up a cheap-talk game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) which explicitly models communication by the central bank, they show that, although full information revelation is desirable, only imperfect communication is possible in an equilibrium, thereby providing a theory of imprecise announcement from policy-makers.
Moscarini (2007) further shows that the more precise signal the central bank observes, the more information is revealed and the higher is welfare. Our paper, by focusing on private news shocks, shows that their conclusion does not apply to news shocks. This paper is also related to the literature of news shocks that …nds news shocks are important in accounting for business cycle ‡uctuations, including Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2014) , Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009 ), Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011 ) or Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012 . While these papers assume symmetric information between the central bank and the private sector, departing from complete information is important because it allows us to discuss how the central bank should communicate its information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to explore optimal information revelation policy to a news shock in a prototypical new Keynesian model. Lorenzoni (2010) explores optimal monetary policy when aggregate ‡uctuations are driven by the private sector's uncertainty about the economy's fundamentals. Contrary to our simple framework, however, information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across private agents. Gaballo (2013) scrutinizes whether the central bank should release its information about future economic conditions in a ‡exible price OLG model. His model is close to Morris and Shin (2002) in that the central bank's announcement is perceived heterogeneously among households due to idiosyncratic noise. In contrast, our analysis is based on a standard model for monetary policy analysis, and the model is much simpler. Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) explores the Ramsey optimal monetary policy to the news shock, but there exists no private information.
Theoretical results
We begin by setting up our baseline model in which the central bank is more informed about future cost-push shocks than is the private sector, and ask this question: is it socially desirable to make the private sector better-informed about future cost-push shocks? We …nd that the answer to this questions is no, regardless of the way the central bank reveals information to the private sector, and regardless of the central bank's commitment ability. Moreover, optimal monetary policy never exploits superior information possessed by the central bank. This holds even when the central bank possesses private news about the policy objective or the natural rate of interest with the binding zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
In answering this question, we do not assume speci…c channels through which the private information of the central bank is conveyed to the private sector: The central bank may be able to send costless messages as in e.g. Stein (1989) and Moscarini (2007) ;
The private sector may infer the central bank's private information from the central bank's actions that depend on its private information as in e.g. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) .
Proofs are simple and based on Jensen's inequality, exploiting the linearity of the new Keynesian Phillips curve and the strict convexity of the loss function.
6 Therefore, the result of the desirability of secrecy about future fundamental shocks holds true in more general, linearized DSGE models such as those with state variables through capital accumulation, habit formation, backward price indexation, and so on.
Environment
We employ the standard analytical framework for optimal monetary policy as in Woodford (2003) , Galí (2008) 
where E P t denotes an expectation conditional on the information available to the private sector in period t, and u t is a cost-push (mark-up) shock. This cost-push shock is distortionary, and creates a time-varying wedge between actual and e¢ cient allocations.
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Social loss is given by
where L is a strictly convex, momentary loss function and 2 [0; 1) is the discount factor. A common speci…cation for L is a quadratic function:
For now we assume that the only fundamental shock that hits the economy is the costpush shock, fu t g 1 t=0 . Its precise nature does not a¤ect our theoretical results, and thus we do not impose any particular structure. 8 The private sector observes contemporaneous cost-push shocks, and thus is originally (i.e. before any information is revealed from the central bank) endowed with a …ltration F = fF t g 1 t=0 such that fu t g 1 t=0 is adapted to it. 9 This allows the private sector to observe informative signals about future cost-push
shocks. There is a central bank, and it is endowed with a …ltration that is …ner than F.
The central bank has thus more information about future cost-push shocks than does 7 When instead non-distortionary shocks hit the economy, any distortion caused by such shocks can be eliminated by appropriate and instantaneous responses by the central bank. There is no need for pre-emptive action to news on non-distortionary shocks. 8 The only restriction is that the loss minimization problem which we introduce shortly must be well-de…ned. This rules out e.g. a shock process that grows too quickly.
9 This is not crucial. If fu t g 1 t=0 is not F-adapted, replace u t in the new Keynesian Phillips curve with E[u t jF t ] and our results hold. the private sector.
An illustrative, two-period model
We …rst provide a simple explanation for why revealing an anticipated shock is not socially desirable in a simple analytical framework and then a formal proof for this undesirability of information revelation in a more general setting.
Consider a two-period version of the economy presented above, in which the output gap is absent and in ‡ation rates are solely driven by exogenous shocks and by the private sector's expectation about a future shock. We do this by setting = 0. The ex-ante social loss is quadratic as in (3) with b = 0:
where, for simplicity of analysis, we assume that = 1.
10 The new Keynesian Phillips curve is given by
In this example we assume that u 0 and u 1 are iid random variables with mean zero and variance 2 u . The central bank observes both (u 0 ; u 1 ) at the beginning of period 0, but the private sector observes u 1 only in period 1. Because the period-1 in ‡ation is solely determined by the period-1 shock, the central bank's ability to commit is irrelevant.
When information about the future fundamental shock is not revealed, expected in ‡ation is zero, E ex-ante welfare loss is thus
If the private sector becomes informed about u 1 , then E P 1 = u 1 and the new Keynesian Phillips curve implies 0 = u 0 + u 1 . The ex-ante welfare loss is now given by
This simple example clari…es why the perfect revelation of future cost-push shocks is detrimental to welfare. Revelation of the future shock only increases the volatility of in ‡ation expectation and, therefore, that of in ‡ation in period 0. Thus, no revelation of a future cost-push shock is better than full revelation. This implication holds true even if and b are strictly positive and the central bank can choose the output gap in periods 0 and 1.
Undesirability of information revelation with commitment
Now we turn to the original, general setting to demonstrate that information revelation is undesirable. We …rst consider the case where the central bank can commit. A benchmark is an optimal commitment policy when the private sector's …ltration is unchanged from F and the central bank chooses in ‡ation and the output gap processes that are F-adapted.
We say that f( t ; x t )g
Lemma 1
The optimal secretive commitment policy is unique (almost everywhere) if it exists.
This lemma immediately follows from the strict convexity of the objective function and the linearity of the constraint. In the following we assume that an optimal secretive commitment policy exists.
Because the central bank is better informed about future cost-push shocks than is the private sector, it is natural to ask whether some information revelation from the central bank is socially bene…cial. One possible approach is to specify a setting in which the central bank's private information is revealed, either costly or costlessly, either perfectly or imperfectly, through a particular channel, e.g. through direct communication or through the private sector's inference from the central bank's actions, and to investigate the best equilibrium in that setting. Whether information revelation is bene…cial or not may, however, depend crucially on the speci…c information transmission channel.
Therefore, we take a more agnostic approach.
Our approach is simple. In any reasonable equilibrium concept in these settings where information is revealed to the private sector in one way or another, equilibrium stochastic processes for in ‡ation and the output gap must satisfy the new Keynesian Phillips curve. In this case, in ‡ation expectations are conditional on a …ltration that is potentially …ner than what the private sector is originally endowed. We show that such processes cannot reduce social loss from the loss achieved by the optimal secretive policy.
We also show that, when the private sector's information is improved in a way that its in ‡ation forecast becomes better, social loss is strictly increased.
The following lemma shows that the presence of a better informed private sector does not reduce social loss.
Lemma 2 Let G = fG t g 1 t=0 and H = fH t g 1 t=0 be …ltrations such that F t G t H t for all t. Then, for any process f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 that is adapted to H and satis…es
there is a process f(~ t ;x t )g 1 t=0 such that (i) it is adapted to F, (ii) it satis…es
and (iii)
for any convex function V . When V is strictly convex, equality holds in (8) if and only if ( t ; x t ) = (~ t ;x t ) almost everywhere for all t.
Proof. Proof is by construction. Fix any f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 that is adapted to H and satis…es (6). Let
Then f(~ t ;x t )g
In Lemma 2 we allow for the possibility that f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 is adapted to a strictly …ner …ltration than the private sector's. This happens for example when the central bank takes action, using its private information, that directly a¤ects either or x, but the private sector's inference is imperfect.
Lemma 2 shows that endowing the private sector with larger …ltration is never strictly better, in terms of the loss. The reason is that ‡uctuations in a stochastic process adapted to a larger …ltration can be, roughly speaking, reduced by taking the conditional expectation using a smaller …ltration, and that the strictly convex loss function favors processes that ‡uctuate less. From the central bank's point of view, it is at best meaningless to provide the private sector with more information.
We now identify a condition under which social loss under information revelation is strictly higher than that of the optimal secretive commitment policy.
If the optimal secretive commitment policy satis…es
then the loss from f( t ; x t )g optimal secretive commitment policy is unique (Lemma 1), it follows that
The intuition behind this result can be seen by rewriting (6) as
Because cost-push shocks are F -adapted, the last term in the right hand side is orthogonal to u t , and its expected value conditional on F t is zero. Therefore, if the last term is nonzero, it is essentially the same as having another disturbance term in the new Keynesian
Phillips curve that is orthogonal to the cost-push shock, which is undesirable.
The condition identi…ed in Proposition 1 is not strong. Suppose that the private sector only observes the contemporaneous u's, that the central bank observes future u's, and that the central bank is able to communicate credibly this information to the private sector. Let G be the …ltration for the private sector after such communication. Then u t+1 is not F t -measurable but is G t -measurable. When the loss function is quadratic, the optimal secretive commitment policy linearly depends on a contemporaneous shock.
This naturally implies
as the left hand side depends on u t+1 but the right hand side does not.
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Moreover, when the condition identi…ed in Proposition 1 is not satis…ed, the private sector is e¤ectively not learning anything useful -new information it obtains doesn't help predict future in ‡ation (under the optimal secretive commitment policy) any better.
Undesirability of information revelation without commitment
Can information revelation be bene…cial when the central bank is unable to commit? To answer this question, we …rst de…ne an equilibrium under discretion. 
Although it is conventional to focus on a Markov perfect equilibrium when considering discretionary policy, we do not require a Markov property here.
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The next proposition shows that, at least when the loss function is quadratic, information revelation is undesirable even without commitment.
and H = fH t g 1 t=0 be …ltrations such that F t G t H t for all t. Then the following holds.
1. For any (G; H)-discretionary policy equilibrium f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 , there exists a (F; F)-
for all t (this equality holds if and only if f( t ; x t )g
where), and 2. Let f t ; x t g 1 t=0 be the best (F; F)-discretionary policy equilibrium, i.e. it minimizes the loss among all (F; F)-discretionary policy equilibria. If
for some t with positive probability, then the best (G; H)-discretionary policy equilibrium yields strictly larger loss minimized loss than f t ; x t g 1 t=0 .
Proof. Let f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 be a (G; H)-discretionary policy equilibrium. Then, for all t, it satis…es the …rst-order necessary and su¢ cient condition for the problem min ;x L( ; x) subject to = x + E[ t+1 jG t ] + u t , which is summarized by
De…ne f(~ t ;x t )g 1 t=0 as in Lemma 2. Then it satis…es
implying that f~ t ;x t g 1 t=0 is a (F; F)-discretionary policy equilibrium. It follows from
Because L is quadratic, the equality holds if and only if f( t ; x t )g 1 t=0 = f(~ t ;x t )g 1 t=0 almost everywhere. This proves the part 1. The proof of the part 2 is essentially the same as that of Proposition 1 and thus is omitted.
Extensions
The main result so far even holds with private news on information other than cost-push shocks. We provide proof that secrecy is optimal even when the central bank possesses private news about the policy objective or the natural rate of interest with the binding zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
A new Keynesian model with the zero lower bound
To demonstrate that our theoretical results easily extend to other linearized DSGE models, here we consider a version of the model in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can bind when a large, negative shock to the natural rate of interest hits the economy. Due to the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rate,
we have to explicitly take into account the dynamic IS equation:
In addition to the cost-push shock fu t g 1 t=0 , the natural rate of interest fr n t g 1 t=0 is also an F-adapted stochastic process. Note, however, that we assume neither that the economy is at the zero lower bound at time 0, nor that the natural rate follows a two-state Markov chain with its steady-state value as the absorbing state. Therefore, this model allows for the zero lower bound to bind multiple times and for the central bank to act di¤erently when it foresees that the zero bound will bind or it cease to bind in the near future.
An optimal secretive commitment policy is an F-adapted process f( t ; x t ; i t )g 1 t=0
that minimizes the loss function (4) subject to the new Keynesian Phillips curve in (5), the dynamic IS equation in (11), and the non-negativity constraint in (10). Then the following proposition immediately holds. 
and the non-negativity constraint in (10).
The second condition identi…es the situation in which expectations in the dynamic IS equation change so much that even lowering the nominal rate to zero is not su¢ cient to maintain the output gap at x t .
This proposition implies that, from the ex-ante point of view, the central bank should be secretive even if the zero lower bound is binding and if it, for example, receives private news that a negative natural rate shock disappears in the near future or that a future cost-push shock is positive. This might sound strange, because the literature has shown that raising in ‡ation expectation can be welfare-improving at the zero lower bound.
The reason behind this seemingly surprising result is simple. Imagine that the private sector becomes better-informed when the zero lower bound is binding. Then its in ‡ation expectations become, from the ex-ante point of view, necessarily more dispersed around the original in ‡ation expectations that are based on a coarser information set. This implies that there are situations in which in ‡ation expectations are raised and social loss is lowered. At the same time, though, there are situations in which in ‡ation expectations are reduced and social loss increased. In other words, the last term in (9) cannot be made always strictly positive. Because the loss function is convex, it is better in terms of the ex-ante loss to implement the average outcome by not making the private sector more informed.
Private news about the central bank' s future policy goals
Delphic forward guidance can be used to talk not only about future distortionary shocks but also about the central bank's objective in the future. We can easily augment our baseline model with a shock that in ‡uences social loss. Let f t g 1 t=0 be an exogenous stochastic process, and social loss is now given by
A quadratic example such as
is used elsewhere in the literature, e.g. Stein (1989) , Moscarini (2007) , and Waki, Dennis, and Fujiwara (2015) . Stein (1989) considers a model in which there is a forward-looking constraint (namely, uncovered interest parity) and the central bank has private information that determines its future action. In a cheap-talk game he …nds that full information revelation is desirable but impossible due to the central bank's inability to commit. This is in contrast to our result that, regardless of the central bank's ability to commit, it is desirable not to disclose any private information to the private sector. The reason for this di¤erence is 14 This discussion holds even if the central bank only observes a noisy signal about contemporaneous .
15 This is in contrast to Moscarini (2007) and Stein (1989) in which full information disclosure is never an equilibrium in a cheap-talk game. The result of Moscarini (2007) does not hold in our model because he uses a static Phillips curve in which cheap-talk can a¤ect in ‡ation expectation. In Appendix A.2 we discuss the model in Stein (1989) in details. again that the private information in Stein (1989) is not a news shock. Details on this point are shown in Appendix A.2. Waki, Dennis, and Fujiwara (2015) consider a monetary-policy delegation problem in a new Keynesian model, in which the shock is private information to the central bank and in ‡uences social loss as in (12), and the central bank is unable to commit. Their paper di¤ers from ours in that the central bank does not possess private news in their model ( is iid), and their focus is on the optimal legislation to be imposed on the central bank's choice.
3 Optimal policy when the private sector becomes more informed about future shocks Now we examine how optimal policy changes when the private sector becomes better informed about future cost-push shocks. For this purpose, we numerically solve for optimal policies with and without commitment, under the assumption that the private sector observes the n-period ahead cost-push shock. For simplicity we assume that cost-push shocks are iid over time, but introducing persistence does not change results qualitatively. In our notation, F is the …ltration generated by the shock process fu t g 1 t=0 , and we consider for each n a situation in which the private sector is endowed with a …ltration G n with G n t = F t+n for all t. We begin with the canonical new Keynesian model, and then proceed to models with endogenous state variables, one with backward price indexation (Steinsson, 2003) and the other with endogenously accumulated capital (Edge, 2003; Takamura, Watanabe, and Kudo, 2006) .
Canonical new Keynesian model
The loss function is quadratic as in (3) with b = = , which can be derived by the second order approximation of the welfare (see Woodford, 2003) . In the new Keynesian Phillips
By solving the loss minimization problem, the optimal targeting rule under commitment is derived as
Since there is no endogenous state variable, optimal targeting rule under discretion can be simply de…ned as
The new Keynesian Phillips curve (1) together with the targeting rule in (13) or (14) determine optimal allocations and prices. Although (13) and (14) are identical to those in the model in which the private sector does not observe future shocks, the optimal policy depends on anticipated future shocks because the new Keynesian Phillips curve does.
Throughout the numerical experiments, we use the unconditional social loss as a welfare metric: 1 is the probability of re-optimization of prices. The standard deviation of the cost-push shock is set to 1%. The parameter is related to structural parameters as Di¤erences in the responses of in ‡ation and the output gap under commitment and under discretion can be most transparently analyzed by looking at impulse responses to an anticipated, future cost-push shock. Figure 2 draws impulse responses to the anticipated positive 1% cost-push shock. In each panel, the period in which the costpush shock materializes corresponds to 0 on the x-axis. We display the responses to the news shock from n = 0 to 4. The top two panels depict the responses of in ‡ation and the output gap under discretion, and the bottom panels depict those under commitment.
Responses under discretion o¤er an intuitive explanation as to why there is no gain from revealing the private news. Observe that, irrespective of whether a shock is anticipated or not, responses after the materialization of shocks are identical. Under optimal discretionary policy, revealing future cost-push information only results in additional ‡uctuations before the realization of the shock, and therefore is undesirable.
In contrast, under commitment, the central bank can lower the in ‡ation response upon materialization of a shock, which is undesirable when the private sector foresees future shocks because it disturbs the new Keynesian Phillips curve, by altering in ‡ation responses after the materialization and the output gap responses. It is clear in Figure 2 that the size of the in ‡ation response in the period when the shock is realized decreases with n. As the new Keynesian Phillips curve implies, a lower contemporaneous in ‡ation response can be achieved only by further reducing in ‡ation expectations and the output gap, which is ine¢ cient. 
Indexation
Next we turn to a setting with backward price indexation, employing the analytical framework used in Steinsson (2003) , in which, a fraction of price setters are assumed to set prices P B t following a simple rule:
where P t 1 denotes an index of the prices set in t 1 and the parameter 2 [0; 1) controls how strong their price setting decision depends on past demand conditions. (1 )(1 )( + ) (1+ ")"
(1 !)
subject to the hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve:
We set = :5 and = :052 as in Steinsson (2003) . Figure 4 illustrates how the unconditional loss L S :
Results
and its components change with n. The unconditional loss is the smallest at n = 0, consistent with our theoretical result. As in the canonical model, we observe that variations in in ‡ation (and in ‡ation di¤erence) are reduced as n is increased from n = 1, at the cost of higher variability in other terms, in particular, that of the output gap. Even with price indexation, central bank secrecy remains optimal monetary policy. Figure 5: Impulse Responses: Indexation future cost-push shocks, the central bank …nds it optimal to smooth in ‡ation rates or the di¤erence in in ‡ation rates to reduce their negative e¤ects on the new Keynesian Phillips curve, and this is accompanied by higher variability of the output gap.
Endogenous Capital
In this subsection, we extend our analysis to the case with endogenous capital K t , by employing the linear quadratic framework for optimal policy analysis in Edge (2003) and Takamura, Watanabe, and Kudo (2006) . The model is a straightforward extension of the new Keynesian model to the endogenous capital formation subject to the convex capital adjustment cost:
where I (1) = , I 0 (1) = 1, and I 00 (1) = " . Variables with an upper bar are level variables, while those without it are log deviations from steady states.
In the presence of endogenous capital, the central bank aims to minimize the quadratic loss function:
2 t 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
; subject to the new Keynesian Phillips curve:
and the resource constraint:
where Y t denotes the output.
17 Figure 7 compares the impulse responses for di¤erent n's. Responses of in ‡ation and marginal costs are qualitatively similar to the above two cases: the response of marginal costs is magni…ed as n increases, and the in ‡ation response upon the realization of a 17 We will also show impulse responses of real marginal costs M C t and investment I t , which are given by:
Results
and shock is reduced. However, it takes much longer for the impulse response of marginal cost to come close to zero. This is due to the fact that marginal costs depend on capital that adjusts only slowly over time. The top-left panel shows that it takes a long time for capital to return to its steady-state level even if n is low, and that the response of capital increases as n increases. This slow-moving property of marginal costs keeps in ‡ation away from zero, before and after the realization of a shock. Figure 6 compares the unconditional loss L K :
and each of its components for di¤erent values of n.
Again the unconditional loss is increasing in n, which is consistent with our theoretical results. What is interesting and di¤erent from the previous two cases is that the variance of in ‡ation tends to increase as n increases. It starts to decrease only after n is raised to around 6. Capital is costly to adjust, in turn making marginal costs more costly to adjust, such that the central bank …nds it better not to reduce the total variation of in ‡ation than to reduce it at the cost of increased variation in marginal costs.
Conclusion
How should monetary policy be designed when the central bank has private information about future economic conditions? We show that social welfare deteriorates when the private sector is made better-informed about future distortionary shocks or policy goals.
Being secretive about private news, constitutes optimal monetary policy when the central bank receives such information. This result also casts doubt on the usefulness of Delphic forward guidance, if it is based on private news about future shocks. Our result also implies that, in a wide class of new Keynesian models, if information acquisition is costly for the central bank, it won't have an incentive to collect information that would allow it to forecast the future better than the private sector.
In the model considered in this paper, the private sector is assumed to have less information than the central bank. A more realistic situation may be that private agents obtain information about future economic conditions which the central bank may not possess. A useful extension of the present work would be to investigate how its information is transmitted during a game with private information, and whether some communication could enhance social welfare. Other possible extensions are to consider non-linear new Keynesian models to examine whether information revelation is still undesirable, a non-benevolent central bank whose objective function depends on its private information possibly through non-pecuniary bene…ts (e.g. perhaps announcing accurate forecasts of future economic conditions increases the central bank's payo¤ over and above any bene…ts from ful…lling its monetary policy objectives), and the possibility that the central bank's private information revelation can resolve Knightian uncertainty that the private sector faces. We leave these questions for our future research.
Rational expectations imply that e = 0, and thus (x ( ); ( )) = 1 + b= ; + b= :
This shows that optimal discretionary policy exploits the central bank's private information.
A.2. Comparison to Stein (1989) -Role of private news
Here we demonstrate that the reason for this di¤erence is that the private information in Stein (1989) is not a news shock, by rewriting his model as a two-period new Keynesian model. The central bank's loss function is
The central bank is unable to commit and chooses 1 as a function of , implying the best response of 1 ( ) = =2:
is private information to the central bank, and has mean 0 and variance 2 . The in ‡ation rate in period 0 is determined by the new Keynesian Phillips curve:
This setting is neither identical to nor nested by our setting.
It is then straightforward to calculate the losses under full and no information revelation. Full revelation implies 0 = 1 ( ), and the loss is (3=4) 2 . No revelation implies 0 = 0, and the loss is (3=2) 2 , which is bigger than the loss under full-revelation.
The desirability of full revelation in Stein's model is due to the assumption that is constant over time, i.e., is not purely a news shock. Because of this property, it is desirable if 0 varies positively with , which is achieved when full information is revealed. Without this property, we can easily show that no revelation is better than full revelation. Consider an alternative loss function where only a¤ects the period 1 loss.
Then no revelation results in a loss of (1=2) 2 while full revelation results in a loss of
The undesirability of information revelation also holds true if the loss function is hit by two shocks that are independent over time, as
Unlike the example in A.2, revealing 0 is irrelevant for welfare. This is because in ‡ation in period 0 is pinned down by 0 = E P [ 1 =2] and thus is independent of 0 . If we change the minimization problem to
subject to 1 ( ) = =2 and
then under the assumption that the central bank does not observe 1 , we see that the optimal choice of ( 0 ; x 0 ) depends on (and only on) 0 .
